The slope of the supply curve for capital equipment has important implications for the macroeconomics of investment and the effects of tax reform on capital accumulation. Goolsbee (1998) has used changes in investment tax incentives to identify whether this supply curve is significantly upward-sloping and has concluded that it is. This paper shows that investment tax incentives are a poor instrument for identifying this supply curve because they are spuriously correlated with supply shocks for equipment producers. Once input costs for equipment producers are controlled for, there is no evidence of a relationship between tax incentives and equipment prices. In fact, the evidence favors a flat supply curve interpretation.
Despite theoretical predictions that the cost of capital should have an important effect on investment, traditionally empirical research has found this effect to be relatively small. One potential explanation for this pattern has been that these estimates are biased downward due to the endogeneity of interest rates: The monetary authorities tend to lower interest rates in response to negative shocks to investment. Thus, a popular alternative approach to identifying the effect of user cost on investment has been to instead focus on variations in the tax component of the cost of capital. However, the evidence on the effect of tax incentives has been mixed. While some studies, such as Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) have argued that, around major tax reforms, the elasticity of investment with respect to the tax portion of the cost of capital is about -2/3 or larger, estimates based on time series regressions, such as those of Peter K. Clark (1993) , have been far smaller, on the order of no more than -0.4.
In an important contribution, Austan Goolsbee (1998) has provided a potential explanation for why tax incentives may impart only a limited stimulus to investment: If the supply curve for capital equipment is sufficiently upward-sloping, then the outward shift in the demand curve for equipment induced by investment tax incentives could mainly result in higher equipment prices rather than higher quantities. In testing this hypothesis, Goolsbee's empirical analysis focused on the effect on equipment prices of tax incentives and revealed a robust relationship consistent with a strongly upward-sloping supply curve for capital equipment. This result has important consequences not only for the macroeconomics of investment but also for public finance since the proponents of fundamental tax reform often stress the beneficial effects on capital formation of improved tax incentives for investment. Interestingly, however, another detailed empirical study of supply curves by John Shea (1993) reports downward-sloping supply curves for the two capital good industries in its sample (construction machinery and aircraft). An important difference between these two studies is their choice of "identifying" demand shock used to trace out the supply curve. Goolsbee uses measures of investment tax incentives while Shea's demand instruments are chosen from a detailed search for variables that satisfy two critera, one indicating they are an important component of an industry's demand, the other suggesting they are likely to have a low correlation with the industry's supply shocks.
This paper re-examines the supply curve for capital equipment and concludes that tax incentives are a poor instrument for identifying this curve because they substantially fail Shea's second criterion of low correlation with supply shocks. Specifically, I show that starting in 1974-75 and continuing until the early 1980s, relative prices for almost all types of equipment rose at a fast pace (or faster than their trend rate) and then for some years after this period, this pattern was reversed. Since the investment tax credit was strengthened in the mid-1970s and eliminated in 1986 this resulted in a correlation between equipment prices and measures of investment tax incentives, implying a strongly upward-sloping supply curve. However, I show that that these gyrations in equipment prices were far more highly correlated with movements in prices of intermediate inputs (energy and materials) and that once these supply shocks are controlled for, there is no evidence of a relationship between equipment prices and tax incentives. In fact, I argue that the response of equipment prices to these supply shocks is instead broadly consistent with a flat supply curve. 1 Supply, Demand, and Equipment Prices As I will focus below on the effect of materials prices on the price of equipment, consider the case of firms producing capital equipment with materials being the only variable input (Q = M α ) implying a marginal cost curve of the form c α Q 1 α −1 , where c is the price of the materials. Suppose there is a large number of firms, n, producing equipment, each taking the price, p, as given and determining their supply by setting marginal cost equal to this price. This implies an equipment supply curve of the form
Suppose now the demand curve for equipment is
where s summarizes investment tax incentives. 1 Setting supply equal to demand and solving for the equilibrium price gives
Re-written in terms of logs we get:
Consider now the two extreme cases of β = 1 (unit elastic investment demand) and β = 0 (price inelastic investment demand). When β = 1 the elasticities of the price of equipment with respect to the tax term and the price of materials are 1 − α and α respectively. When β = 0 the elasticity with respect to the tax term is zero while the elasticity with respect to the materials price is 1 or, more accurately, a coefficient equal to materials' share in total variable cost, here assumed to be 1.
Of course, if the equipment industry is better approximated by free entry and so the number of firms is not fixed, then zero profits implies a price of equipment that is independent of tax incentives. In this case, we have log (p) = log(
where F measures fixed costs. The regressions below suggest that this competitive price equation appears to fit the data well. Note that, when firms are price takers, then α can be observed as the ratio of total materials costs to the value of output since cM pQ = α is a first-order condition. The estimated elasticities with respect to material prices reported in Section 3 reveal coefficients similar to this observed ratio.
The Data

The Relative Price of Equipment
Figures 1A and 1B show the behavior of equipment prices relative to the GDP deflator over the period 1959 to 1997. Through 1994, these data can be obtained from Table 7.8 of Department of Commerce (1998a); data from 1995-97 can be found in Department of and so on. However, since we are only focusing on prices and taxes, this is a reasonable simplification for our purposes.
Commerce (1998b). This sample is longer than the 1959-1988 sample used by Goolsbee, which was taken from Department of Commerce (1993) and since many of these series are based on hedonic adjustment methodologies that have changed over time, one cannot exactly replicate Goolsbee's results with this data set. However, as I show below, the qualitative features of his results can still be obtained from these data.
Two patterns emerge strongly from Figures 1A and 1B . First, many of the relative prices have substantial trends over time. While some types of equipment appear to have upward trends, more noticeable are the downward trends for computing equipment and other "high-tech" categories such as communications equipment and instruments. The decline in the relative price of capital equipment is, of course, due to the radical improvements in productivity in high-tech industries, a well-known fact that has featured prominently in recent attempts to explain the process of aggregate productivity growth. 2 Thus, it is necessary to control for these long-term trends and, in the regressions below, we follow Goolsbee in including a time trend on the right-hand-side of the relative price regressions.
The second noticeable pattern is that, for a wide range of equipment types, there was a sharp rise in relative prices beginning in 1974-75 and continuing until the early to mid-1980s. 
Equipment Prices and the ITC
Equipment Prices and Intermediate Input Prices
The relationship between the ITC and equipment prices suggests the possibility that the swings in these prices have been due to shifts in the demand for equipment caused by changes in tax incentives. An alternative possibility is that these swings were due to supply shocks. Indeed, the 1974-75 surge in equipment prices lines up exactly with the initial OPEC energy price increases. The 1975 Economic Report of the President (pg. 39) noted the rapid growth in equipment prices and explained it as being due to rising costs. As can be seen in Figure 3 , during this period, firms had to deal with more than just a surge in To assess the importance of movements in input costs, I used price deflators for intermediate inputs from the NBER manufacturing productivity database (Bartelsman and Gray, 1996). These price deflators, available for all 4-digit manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1994, were calculated using Input-Output tables and price deflators for 529 types of material inputs and 6 types of energy inputs. By matching each type of equipment with the two, three, or four-digit industry that produces it, I derived price deflators for the intermediate inputs required to produce each type of equipment. The average correlation of 0.42 is far higher and 12 of the 22 equipment prices have correlations higher than 0.54, which is the highest correlation between any price and the ITC.
However, while certainly suggestive, these simple summary statistics do not rule out the hypothesis that investment tax incentives also affect equipment prices, but rather suggest the need for inclusion of intermediate input costs as explanatory variables in equipment price regressions.
Regressions
The basic regression specification is (6) where P E it is the relative price of equipment of type i (where relative means in relation to the GDP deflator), P M it is the relative price of intermediate inputs for equipment of type i, t is a time trend, GROW is GDP growth, NIXON is a variable accounting for the Nixon price controls from 1971-74, and T AX it is a variable measuring investment tax incentives. This differs from Goolsbee's specification only in including P M and omitting exchange rate variables, which I did not find had a significant effect or influenced the results. 4 In 1974 non-energy services accounted for 25 percent of GDP, and the price deflator for this category fell substantially relative to the GDP deflator. 5 The details of this matching exercise are provided in Appendix A. 6 It was necessary to detrend the relative intermediate input prices since for some industries, such as computing, material prices have fallen rapidly over time.
All equations were estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique and the estimation sample was 1961-1994. Table 1 , where τ is the marginal corporate income tax rate and z is the present discounted value of depreciation allowances per dollar invested. Table 2 repeats the regressions using this full tax term in place of the ITC and shows similar results. 7 A significant relationship, although negative this time, between the tax term and the price of equipment is evident in the simple regressions, with an estimated pooled elasticity of -0.11
Static Regression Results
(standard error, 0.006), which compares with Goolsbee's estimate of -0.1774 (standard error 0.02). However, again, once we include P M as an explanatory variable, these results are overturned. 7 The details behind the construction of this tax term are in Appendix B. My empirical calculation differed slightly from the formula in the text in taking into account the fact that, for some years, firms were required to reduce their depreciation base by some proportion of their investment tax credit. Tables 1 and 2 show that these basic regressions have highly autocorrelated errors (although those including P M tend to have higher Durbin-Watson statistics). This suggests that the simple specification is missing some important dynamics. Goolsbee's solution to this problem, an AR(2) correction, implies a very specific form of dynamic specification in which both lagged dependent and explanatory variables affect the current period's value of the dependent variable. However, simple tests suggested that including lags of the explanatory variables did not improve the residual autocorrelation problem but that including two lags of the dependent variable did. Thus, Tables 3 and 4 repeat the regressions from Tables 1 and 2 , this time with two lags of the dependent variable. The tables report the long-run effects for the tax and input price variables; in other words, they report the estimated coefficients divided by one minus the sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. Standard errors for these long-run effects were calculated by the Delta method.
Dynamic Regression Results
The message from the results in Tables 3 and 4 is very similar to the earlier results.
Without P M, there appears to be a strong relationship between the prices for a large number of equipment types and the ITC or tax term; once P M is included these coefficients usually become insignificant. One exception is the "pooled estimate" for the tax term elasticity which is -0.09 (standard error 0.03). However, this estimate is something of an anomaly since none of the individual regression coefficients for this term are significantly negative.
One question concerning these results relates to the econometric specification. Kevin
Hassett and Glenn Hubbard (1998) have critiqued Goolsbee's results as being the result of a spurious regression, arguing that the relative equipment prices and tax term variables are both I(1) variables but are not cointegrated. In this case, the regression should be run in differences and they show that when this is done, they do not obtain significant coefficients on the tax variables. That the tax variables are insignificant once the regression is estimated in differences should not be too surprising since Figures 2A and 2B show that while some of the relative equipment prices are correlated with the level of the ITC, the year-to-year movements tend not to be closely related. Conversely, I find that if one estimates the SUR equation system in first-differences including P M then one still obtains highly significant coefficients on P M, similar in size to those obtained from the levels estimation. Thus whether the regression should be run in levels or differences does not affect our conclusion.
Given that econometric tests are notoriously poor at distinguishing unit root behavior from trend stationarity (which may describe relative equipment prices well) or stationarity with regime shifts (which may fit the corporate tax code well) it is also very possible that the levels estimates reported here are the appropriate ones.
Interpretation
These results suggest that regressions relating equipment prices to investment tax incentives but excluding input prices are mis-specified. The correlation between the tax variables and input prices produces spurious estimates of a large effect of tax incentives on equipment prices, estimates that disappear once one controls for input prices.
It is important to note that despite the coincidence of the common pattern displayed by most of the equipment prices with shifts in the price of oil, these results are not obtained because of an omitted aggregate variable that could be captured using year dummies. Indeed, Goolsbee reports regressions including year dummies designed to pick up aggregate effects and finds that the inclusion of these dummies does not affect his estimates. This result is still qualitatively true with this updated data set. While I found that the inclusion of year dummies produces a weaker estimated relationship between tax variables and equipment prices, many of the tax coefficients are still significant. However, again, once P M is included these results disappear and the fit of the equations is noticeably improved.
That equipment-specific input prices explain the behavior of equipment prices better than aggregate year dummies should not be surprising given the facts documented in Section 2. The magnitudes of the swings in relative equipment prices and in input costs differed markedly across different types of equipment. Thus, one would not expect that aggregate year-dummies would capture these effects as well as the inclusion of the appropriate equipment-specific input price variable.
Do these results imply that investment demand is unaffected by tax incentives? Not necessarily. As discussed above, there were two cases in which tax incentives had no effect on equipment prices. The first was one in which the equipment supply curve was upwardsloping and firms had price-insensitive investment demand (β = 0). The other was the case in which free entry led to a flat supply curve, no matter what value β took. Note, though, that the equipment price elasticity with respect to P M differed in these two cases: With an upward-sloping supply curve, the elasticity should equal the ratio of intermediate input Sample is 1961-1994. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the equipment price minus the log of the GDP deflator. P M is the log of the relative equipment-specific price of energy and material inputs. Each equation also includes a time trend, GDP growth, and a Nixon price controls variable and the 22 equations were estimated jointly using SUR. The pooled coefficients were restricted to be the same across all equations. Sample is 1961-1994. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the equipment price minus the log of the GDP deflator. P M is the log of the relative equipment-specific price of energy and material inputs. Each equation also includes a time trend, GDP growth, and a Nixon price controls variable and the 22 equations were estimated jointly using SUR. The pooled coefficients were restricted to be the same across all equations. Sample is 1961-1994. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the equipment price minus the log of the GDP deflator. P M is the log of the relative equipment-specific price of energy and material inputs. Each equation also includes two lags of the relative equipment price, a time trend, GDP growth, and a Nixon price controls variable and the 22 equations were estimated jointly using SUR. The pooled coefficients were restricted to be the same across all equations. Note: ρ is the sum of the coefficients on lagged relative equipment prices. Sample is 1961-1994. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the log of the equipment price minus the log of the GDP deflator. P M is the log of the relative equipment-specific price of energy and material inputs. Each equation also includes two lags of the relative equipment price, a time trend, GDP growth, and a Nixon price controls variable and the 22 equations were estimated jointly using SUR. The pooled coefficients were restricted to be the same across all equations. Note: ρ is the sum of the coefficients on lagged relative equipment prices. Tables 3 and 4 .
Thus, the evidence favors the flat supply curve interpretation, implying a highly competitive market structure with free entry keeping economic profits low. Is this a credible conclusion? While the extreme assumptions of competition and free entry may not match the reality, the market for equipment in the U.S. is extremely open to international trade compared to other markets, and this probably helps to keep prices near the level consistent with zero economic profits.
Equipment Tax Incentives and Materials Costs
The results so far have used variations in input costs to show that the equipment producing industry is well approximated by the assumption of a flat supply curve. However, I
have implicitly assumed that the shifts in the prices of the intermediate inputs used to produce equipment are true "supply shocks" which are independent of the tax treatment of equipment purchases. It is possible that this assumption is false. If equipment demand is price sensitive then an increase in investment tax incentives for good i will raise demand for the materials used to produce good i. Thus, if the producers of this good represented a sufficiently large proportion of the demand for their material inputs and the supply curve for these inputs is upward-sloping, then such an increase in demand could significantly raise the price of their inputs. Indeed, it may still be that through this mechanism there is a significant "crowding out" of the positive demand effect of tax incentives, even if the supply curves for producers of capital equipment were flat.
Not surprisingly, given the correlations evident in the charts shown earlier, simple regressions of the same form as equation 6 but instead using log (P M it ) as the dependent variable produce significant coefficients on tax incentives, which could be construed as evidence in favor of this interpretation. However, for a number of reasons, it seems far more likely that this relationship is spurious.
Firstly, I found that if one augments these simple input price regressions with related variables likely to be exogenous to domestic equipment demand, such as the aggregate PPIs for energy and steel (both of which are largely determined by worldwide supply and demand conditions) then tax incentives are no longer a significant explanatory variable. Secondly, information on quantity movements points against the demand-shock interpretation of input price movements. In particular, the correlation between tax incentives and input prices for 
where N is the number of intermediate inputs, M ik is total purchases by industry i of intermediate input k, M k is total production (for both intermediate and final use) of input k, and ω ik is the share of input k in industry i's materials costs: 8
This measure is best understood using a simple numerical example. Suppose an industry has two inputs with outlays on each being the same (ω 1 = ω 2 = 0.5) and the industry demands 10 percent of the total production of input 1 and 70 percent of the total production of input 2. In this case, our measure of size equals 0.5 * 0.1 + 0.5 * 0.7 = 0.4, which implies that shifts in this industry's demand are likely to have a sizeable impact on the weighted-average price of its intermediate inputs. Thus, if we were looking for good demand instruments for the set of "synthetic" weightedaverage industries that supply their inputs to each equipment producing industry, in each case, the equipment producers would fail John Shea's first criterion, which requires that they demand a high proportion of the supplying industry's output. 10 As such, it would strain credibility to suggest that more generous tax incentives for these equipment industries could significantly raise the weighted average price of their intermediate inputs.
One can note, though, that the construction method behind the NBER input deflators implicitly assumes that the price of each individual input is the same for all equipment producers (since they are constructed by weighting aggregate deflators for input prices according to each input's share in costs). It is possible, though, that for some equipment producers an increase in demand could result in higher prices for a specific input for those producers, even if the the price of that input is unchanged for all other firms. For example, 8 These calculations were derived in three steps. First, I constructed "industries" based on each of the NIPA equipment categories used in this paper using 
Conclusion
The effect of tax incentives on capital investment is a very important economic policy issue.
Beyond specific policies such as the investment tax credit, understanding the response of investment to tax incentives is crucial for assessing the likely long-run effects of tax reform proposals, many of which stress their beneficial effects on capital formation. Thus, the hypothesis of a steep upward-sloping supply curve for capital equipment, as proposed by Goolsbee, has profound implications for a number of policy debates. This paper has re-examined the evidence on the link between equipment prices and tax incentives and concluded that Goolsbee's result that investment tax incentives drive up equipment prices appears to be spurious. Once one controls for variations in prices of energy and material inputs, there is no evidence that tax incentives affect equipment prices. In fact, the evidence is broadly consistent with a flat supply curve for capital equipment. An important implication of a flat supply curve is that one can only identify the price elasticity of investment demand by examining quantity movements. Thus, the challenge for macroeconomists is to reconcile the macroeconomic evidence of a weak effect of the user cost of capital on investment quantities with microeconomic evidence such as that of Cummins, Hassett, and Hubbard (1994) which suggests a large effect.
B Construction of the Full Tax Term
The full tax term was defined to be 1 − IT C − (1 − θ * IT C) τ z 1 − τ where τ is the marginal corporate tax rate, z is the present discounted value of depreciation allowances, IT C is the investment tax credit, and θ is the proportion of the investment tax credit that needs to be deducted from the depreciation base. Table 6 displays the investment tax credit for each type of equipment, taken from Gravelle (1994) . The parameter θ was set equal to zero for all years apart from 1962 (for which it was set equal to 1) and the period 1982-86 (for which it was set to 0.5). The present discounted value of depreciation allowances was calculated based on the service life assumptions shown in Table 7 , again largely taken from Gravelle. Prior to 1981, the income stream of depreciation allowances for each type of equipment was calculated based on the assumption that firms claimed allowances using the double declining balance method switching to the so-called "Sum of the Year's Digits" method. 
